Electricity markets analysis and design(Mathematical Economics) by Vasin, Alexander & Vasina, Polina
Title Electricity markets analysis and design(MathematicalEconomics)
Author(s)Va in, Alexander; Vasina, Polina




Type Departmental Bulletin Paper
Textversionpublisher
Kyoto University
Electricity markets analysis and design*
Alexander Vasin1,3, Polina Vasina2.
1Lomonosov Moscow State University
2Dorodnicyn Computing Center ofthe RAS
3New Economic Schoot Moscow
Abstract.
This paper considers Nash equilibria of the unique-price supply ffinction auction for a
homogeneous good. We discuss different estimates and indices of the market power with respect
to an electricity market and show that standard criteria of the market competitiveness are too soft
for this market. We obtain the more strict conditions that provide a sufficiently small deviation
of the market price $\theta om$ the Walrasian price. The second part studies the problem of multiple
Nash equilibria for the network supply hnction auction in the electricity market. We show that
under typical parameters of the market, its equilibria may be approximated by the equilibria of
the market without transmission losses. This result permits to reduce the number of possible
equilibria and simplifies the analysis ofthe market.
1. Introduction.
An important economic tendency of the last 30 years was the development of markets for
electricity and natural gas in several countries. The creation of a market includes forming of
several private generating companies, and determination of the market mechanism for their
interaction with consumers. In many existing wholesale markets, the most important part of this
mechanism is a regular supply hnction or a double auction that determines the market price and
the production volume for each company. Typically this auction is organized as a unique price
auction (though some studies show that Vickrey auction might be the more efficient form of the
interaction, see Vasin, Vasina (2005).
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Creation of the market structure concerns the following problem. On one hand, in order to
reduce the market power and prevent a large increase of the market price over the competitive
equilibrium price, it seems reasonable to split th$e$ generation sector into many small companies.
On the other hand, the scale effect and the reliability of the electricity supply (that is very
important for Russia) require creation of sufficiently large generating companies. Thus an
important question is what minimal degree of the splitting provides the sufficiently small
deviation ofthe market price ffom the competitive equilibrium price.
Our previous study (Vasin and Vasina, 2005) shows that stable rational behavior of agents at
the supply ffinction auction corresponds to the Coumot equilibrium outcome. So the question
about splitting implies the following theoretical problems.
The first one is evaluation of the Cournot price deviation $\hslash om$ the Walrasian price under
given market structure and available information on the parameters of the market. It is important
to discuss the known indices of the market competitiveness (in particular, Concentration ratio
and Herfindahl-Hircshman index, see Hircshman, 1963, Tirole, 1997) in context of such
evaluation. In Section 3 we obtain an estimate of deviation of the Cournot price ffom the
Walrasian price depending on the demand elasticity and the share of the largest company in the
market. We also discuss standard criteria of the market competitiveness related to Concentration
ratio and Herfindahl-Hircshman index and show that they are too soft for the electricity market.
We obtain the more strict conditions that provide a sufficiently small deviation of the market
price $fi\cdot om$ the Walrasian price.
Another important problem relates to the network structure of electricity and gas markets.
Below we show that in context ofthe imperfect competition study, the losses under transmission
are not so important since the loss coeffcient usually does not exceed 0.1. However,
transmission capacity constraints essentially influence the properties of the market in many
cases. Our study (2005) shows that, even for the simplest network market with two nodes, there
exist 5 possible variants of the Nash Equilibrium (NE below), moreover, 3 NE may coexist
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under some parameters. This makes the analysis of the market a complicated problem. Below we
develop an approach to reduce the number of possible equilibria under consideration. We
employ two ideas. First, we show that some equilibria are incompatible, and provide a simple
rule that distinguishes one of three variants as a possible $NE$ under given parameters of the
market. Then we show that an equilibrium of any market with losses may be approximated by
some equilibrium of the similar market without losses. Thus we reduce to 3 the number of
possible variants of $NE$ for a two-node market and show that at most two $NE$ may coexist for a
market without losses. We also give an example where two $NE$ coexist, so in general it is
impossible to improve the result.
2. Survey ofliterature.
The problem of imperfect competition in the markets for homogeneous goods (gas,
electricity etc) is widely discussed in the literature. For the empirical investigation see Sykes and
Robinson (1987). The corresponding theoretical models consider a local market without network
structure. Static one-period models (Baldick et al. (2000), Green (1992), Klemperer and Mayer
(1989)) describe a sealed bid unique-price auction as a normal form game and characterize its
Nash equilibria. The latter paper studies a model of competition via arbitrary supply ffinctions set
by producers. For a given demand function they show that for any price above the Walrasian one
there exists the corresponding Nash equilibrium. Green and Newbery (1992) consider a
symmetric duopoly with linear supply and demand functions and obtain the explicit expressions
for computation of the Nash equilibrium. Baldick et al. (2000) generalize their result for an
asymmetric oligopoly. Abolmasov and Kolodin (2002) and Dyakova (2003) apply this approach
for a study of the electricity markets in two Russian regions. They use affine approximations of
the actual supply functions.
Let us note that the assumption on the affine structure of supply hnctions does not
correspond neither to the actual cost structure of generating companies, nor to the rules of supply
functions auctions. Typically every producer can make a bid corresponding to the non-
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decreasing step supply function. The project of the Russian wholesale electricity market permits
up to 3 steps in a bid of one firm for each hour (see The Model of the Russian Wholesale
Market). The step structure of a bid approximately corresponds to the actual structure of
variable costs of generating companies. Usually every such company owns several generators
with limited capacities and approximately fixed marginal costs. The main part of these costs is
the hel costs.
Our previous paper Vasin, Vasina (2005) studies properties ofNash equilibria for the supply
function auction, where a bid is a non-decreasing step function. We start with investigation ofthe
local market. We show that there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in the Coumot model for any
non-increasing demand Mctlon with the non-decreasing demand elasticity under mild
assumptions on the demand asymptotics as the price tends to infinity. We develop a descriptive
method for computation of the Coumot outcome under any affine demand $\Phi nction$ and piece-
wise constant marginal costs of producers. In the general case, we obtain an explicit upper
estimate of the deviation of the Coumot outcome from the Walrasian outcome proceeding ffom
the demand elasticity and the maximal share of one producer in th$e$ total supply at the Walrasian
price.
Amir (1996) and Amir and Lambson (2000) study existence and uniqueness of the Nash
equilibrium in the Cournot model for logconvex and logconcave inverse demand ffinctions.
(Note that $D^{-- 1}(v)$ is concave (convex) if $p|D^{l}(p)|$ increases (decreases) in $p.$) Thus, the first
property is stronger than increasing of the demand elasticity while the second may hold or not
hold in our case. A typical example of the demand ffinction with increasing elasticity that does
not meet the both properties is the demand for a necessary good with the low elasticity for low
prices and the high elasticity for high prices, such that consumers prefer some substitute.
Vasin and Vasina (2005) consider also a model where the market price is determined from
the balance of the demand and the actual supply of the sealed bid auction and producers set
arbitrary non-decreasing step supply functions as their strategies. We show that, besides the
190
Cournot outcome, there exist other Nash equilibria. For any such equilibrium the cut price lies
between the Walrasian price and the Coumot price. Vice versa, for any price between the
Walrasian price and the Coumot price, there exists th$e$ corresponding equilibrium. However, we
show that only the Nash equilibrium corresponding to the Coumot outcome is stable with respect
to some adaptive dynamics ofproducers’ strategies under general conditions.
This result echoes Moreno and Ubeda (2002) who obtained a similar proposition for a two-
stage model where at the first stage producers choose production capacities, and at the second
stage they compete by setting the reservation prices. The difference is that in our model the
Coumot type equilibrium always exists under fixed production capacities since the agents set the
production volumes as well as the reservation prices.
Our results differ from Klemperer and Meyer (1989) who study competition with arbitrary
supply functions reported by producers. Under similar conditions, they obtain an infinite set of
Nash equilibria corresponding to all prices above the Walrasian price. Our constraint that permits
only non-decreasin$g$ step functions is reasonable in context of studying electricity markets. The
step structure of the supply function is typical for generating companies and corresponds to the
actual rules and the projects ofthe markets in different countries (see Hogan, 1998).
The second part of Vasin and Vasina (2005) considers a simple network market-the market
with two nodes. As above, each local market is characterized by the demand $\Phi nction$ and the
finite set of producers with non-decreasing marginal costs. For every producer his strategy is a
reported supply hnction that determines his supply of the good depending on the price. The
markets are connected by a transmitting line with fixed share of losses and transmission capacity.
Under given strategies of producers, the network administrator first computes the cut prices for
the separated markets. If the ratio of the prices is sufficiently close to one then transmission is
unprofitable with account of the loss. In this case, the outcome is determined by the cut prices for
the isolated markets. Otherwise the network administrator sets the flow to the market with the
higher cut price (for instance market 2). This flow reduces the supply and increases the cut price
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at the market 1. Simultaneously it increases the supply and reduces the cut price at the market 2.
If the transmitted volume does not exceed the transmission capacity, the network administrator
determines this volume so that the ratio of the final cut prices corresponds to the loss coefficient.
Otherwise, the administrator sets the volume to be equal to the transmission capacity. Thus, he
acts as if perfectly competitive intermediaries transmit the good from one market to the other. It
is easy to show that such strategy maximizes the total welfare if the reported supply hnctions
correspond to the actual costs.
We consider Coumot competition model for this market. Our study shows that there exist
three possible types ofNash equilibrium: 1) an equilibrium with zero flow between the markets
and the ratio of the prices close to 1; such equilibrium is determined as if there are two separated
markets; 2) an equilibrium with a positive flow and the ratio of the prices corresponding to the
loss coeffcient; 3) an equilibrium with a positive flow equal to the transmission capacity and the
ratio ofthe prices exceeding the loss coefficient.
Proceeding Rom the first order condition, we defme local equilibria of each type and show
how to compute them. Then we study under what conditions the local equilibrium is a real Nash
equilibrium. For the market with constant marginal costs and affine demand functions, we
determine the set ofNash equilibria depending on the parameters. One interesting finding is that,
in the symmetric case with equal parameters ofthe local markets and a small loss coefficient, the
local equilibrium corresponding to the isolated markets is not a Nash equilibrium, but there exist
two asymmetric Nash equilibria with a positive flow ofthe good.
Then we consider a standard network auction of supply functions (with unique nodal prices)
and generalize the results obtained for the local auction: stable Nash equilibria correspond to the
Coumot outcomes.
3. Evaluation of the market power and Cournot competition.
According to the previous results, the expected outcome ofthe unique-price supply hnction
auction under rational behavior of agents corresponds to the Cournot equilibrium. Hence it is
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reasonable to consider deviation ofthe Coumot price $p^{t}$ from the Walrasian price $\tilde{p}$ as a
measure of the market inefficiency related to the market power of the agents. Below we obtain
an estimate ofthis deviation depending on the demand elasticity and the share of the largest
company in the market. We also discuss the known market indices with respect to analysis ofthe
supply function auction at the electricity market.
Consider a market with a homogenous good and a finite set of producers $A$ . Each producer
$a$ is characterized by his cost ffinction $C^{a}(v)$ with the non-decreasing marginal cost for
$v\in[0,V^{a}]$ , where $V^{a}$ is his production capacity. The precise form of $C^{a}(v)$ is his private
information. The practically important case is where the marginal cost is a step ffinction:
$C^{a}(0)=0,$ $C^{a’}(v)=c_{j}^{a}$ for $v \in(\sum_{/=0}^{j- 1}V^{a},\sum_{=0}^{i}V^{a}),$ $V_{0}^{a}=0,$ $i=1,..,m,$ $\sum_{\iota}^{m}V^{a}=V^{a}$ . Consumers’
behavior is characterized by the demand $\Phi nctionD(p)$ , which is continuously differentiable,
decreases in $p$ , tends to $0$ as $p$ tends to infinity, and is known to all agents.
Recall basic definitions.
Combination $(v^{a},a\sim\in A)$ ofproduction volumes is a Walrasian equilibrium (WE) and $\tilde{p}$ is a
def
Walrasian price of the local market if, for any $a,$ $\sim v^{a}\in S^{a}(\tilde{p})=Arg\max_{v^{a}}(v^{a}\tilde{p}-C^{a}(v^{a}))$ ,
$\sum_{a}v^{a}\sim=D(\tilde{p})$ .
Note. The theoretical supplyfunction $S^{a}(p)$ determines the (generally non-unique) optimal
production volume ofthe firm $a$ under a given price $p$ . Formally, it is a non-decreasing closed
upper semi-continuous point-set mapping with convex values. A trivial result is that the unique
Walrasian price exists under the specified assumptions on the demand function.
For a game $\Gamma=<A,X^{a},f^{a}(x),x\in X,a\in A>$ with the set of players $A$ , the set $X^{a}$ of
strategies and the payofffunction $f^{a}$ for each player $a$ , strategy combination $x^{n}=(x^{a^{*}},a\in A)$
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is a Nash equilibrium (NE) if $f^{o}(x^{*})\geq f^{a}(x^{*}||x^{a})$ for any $a,$ $x^{a}\in X^{a}$ . Existence of NE for
the models under consideration is established below.
Cournot competition. Consider a model of Coumot competition for the given market. Then a
strategy of each producer $a$ is his production volume $v^{a}\in[0,V^{a}]$ . Producers set these values
simultaneously. Let $\vec{v}=(v^{a},a\in A)$ denote a strategy combination. The market price $p(\overline{v})$
equalizes the demand with the actual supply: $p( \overline{v})=D^{-1}(\sum_{o\in A}v^{a})$ . The payoff function of
producer $a$ determines his profit $f^{a}(\overline{v})=v^{a}p(varrow)-C^{a}(v^{a})$ . Thus, the interaction in the Coumot
model corresponds to the normal form game $\Gamma_{C}=\{A,[0,V^{a}],f^{a}(\overline{v}),\overline{v}\in\bigotimes_{a\in\Lambda}[0,V^{a}],a\in A\}$ ,
where $[0,V^{a}]$ is a set of strategies $a\in A$ .
Combination $(v^{a^{l}},a\in A)$ of production volumes is a Cournot equilibrium (CE) if it is a NE
in the game $\Gamma_{C}$ .
Let $(v^{a*},a\in\Lambda)$ denote Nash equilibrium production volumes and $p=D^{-1}( \sum_{aeA}v^{a}")$ be the
corresponding price. A necessary and sufficient condition for this collection to be a Nash
equilibrium is that, for any $a$ ,
$p^{*}\in\Lambda rgp\in[D^{-1}(\begin{array}{l}m\sum_{b\cdot a}v^{b}+V^{o}\end{array}),)]$
$\# D(p)-D(p)+v^{\theta})p-C^{a}(D(p)-D(p)+v^{a^{*}})\}$
Then the F.O.C. for Nash equilibrium is
$v^{a^{r}}\in(p-C^{a’}(v^{a}))|D$‘ $(p^{r})|$ , for any $a$ s.t. $C^{a}$ ‘ (0) $<p$ (1)
$v^{a^{l}}=0$ if $C^{a’}(0)\geq p^{\iota}$ , (2)
where $C^{a’}(v)=[C_{-}^{a’}(v),C_{+}^{a^{1}}(v)]$ in the break points ofthe marginal cost function.
In particular, $C_{+}^{a’}(V^{a})=\infty$ .
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Combination $(p,v^{a^{l}},a\in A)$ is called a local Coumot equilibrium if it meets the necessary
conditions (1), (2).
Let us define the Coumot supply Rnction $S_{C}^{a}(p)$ of a producer $a$ for $p>0$ as a solution of
the system (1),(2). This function determines the optimal production volume of producer $a$ if $p$
is a Coumot equilibrium price. The function is uniquely defined for any cost function $C^{a}$ . In
particular, consider the case with piece-wise linear cost functions and affne demand function
$D(p)= \max$($O$, D-dp). Then
$S_{C}^{a}(p)=\{\begin{array}{ll}0, p<c_{I}^{a},(p c_{1}^{a})d if (p-c_{1}^{a})d<r_{1}^{a},V_{1}^{a} if (p-c_{2}^{a})d<\nabla_{1}^{a}<(p-c_{1}^{a})d,(p c_{2}^{a})d if V_{1}^{a}\leq(p-c_{2}^{a})d\leq V_{1}^{a}+V_{2}^{0} , .V_{1}^{a} V_{2}^{g} if (p-c_{2}^{a})d<V_{1}^{g}+V_{2}^{a}<(p-c_{3}^{a})d,V^{a} if (p-c_{m}^{a})d>V^{a}.\end{array}$
Figure 1 shows a typical form of this hnction. The Coumot price $p$ ’ is determined by the
equation $\sum_{a}S_{C}^{a}(p^{t})=D(p^{n})$ .
$c_{1}$ $c_{2}$ $c_{3}$ $p$
Our paper Vasin, Vasina (2005) provides the following estimate of the Coumot price
deviation from the Walrasian price, proceeding from the demand elasticity
$e(p)=p|D’(p)|/D(p)$ and the maximal share of one firm in the total production at the Walrasian
equilibrium.
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Proposition 1. Let $e(p)\geq\overline{e}$ for any $p\geq\tilde{p}$, $\max_{a}S^{a+}(\tilde{p})/S^{+}(\tilde{p})\leq 1/m$ , and $en>1$ . Then
$\tilde{p}/p\geq 1-1/(\overline{e}n)$, $\sum_{a}v^{a}/D(\tilde{p})\geq(1-1/(\overline{e}n))^{\overline{e}}$ .
The given upper bound of deviation from the Walrasian price may be inconvenient for
practical use since the shares of firms and the demand elasticity at the Walrasian price are
typically unobservable, while the actual values under rational behavior of agents correspond to
the Coumot outcome. Below we focus on the case where $D(p)$ is linear in the practically
important interval ofprices.
Proposition 2. Let the maximal share of one firm in the total production at the Cournot
equilibrium meet inequality $\max_{a}v/a\sum_{be\Lambda}\mathcal{V}^{b}\leq/_{n}^{1}$ and the demand elasticity at this price
$e=^{dp}/l(\overline{D}-dp)^{meet}$ condition $ne>1$ . Then
$\frac{p}{\tilde{p}}-1\leq\frac{1}{(e^{l}n-1)}$ . (3).
This estimate becomes a strict equalityfor a symmetric oligopoly with aftxed marginal cost
$c=\tilde{p}$ and unbinding capacity constraints. This case also gives the maximal possible loss of the
total welfare: $w/_{\tilde{w}}=1-(1- \frac{D(p)}{D(c)})^{2}=1-\frac{1}{(n+1)^{2}}$ .
Proof. Consider a fixed profile $(v^{a},a\in A)$ of production volumes at the Coumot
equilibrium. First, we determine the maximal deliation of the Walrasian price $\tilde{p}$ from the
Cournot price $p$ under this profile. Note the following relation betmeen the Coumot and
Walrasian supply functions: for any $p$ and $a,$ $S_{-}^{a}(p-S_{C}^{a}(p)/d)\leq S_{C}^{a}(p)$ . In particular, for any
$a$ , $S_{-}^{a}(p-v^{f}/d)\leq v^{a^{*}}$ , $S_{C}^{a}(p)>v’$ . Hence, for $\overline{a}=\arg\max_{a}v^{a}$ and otherwise
$\overline{p}=p-v^{\overline{a}}/d$ , $S_{-}(\overline{p})\leq S_{C}(p)=D(p)<D(\overline{p})$ . Thus $\tilde{p}\geq\overline{p}$ . Moreover, $\tilde{p}=\overline{p}$ under
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sufficiently large $S_{+}^{\overline{a}}(\overline{p})$ , and the maximal deviation
$p/ \tilde{p}-1=\frac{v^{\overline{a}}/d}{p-v^{\overline{a}}/d}=\frac{1/n}{dp/D(p)-1/n}=\frac{1}{e(p)n-1}.$Q.E.D.
Note. Another interesting example that provides the same ratio between the Coumot and the
Walrasian prices is where a large firm with the market share $/1n$ ’ a fixed marginal cost $c$ and
unbounded capacity interacts with the competitive fringe with lower costs and maximal capacity
$V_{F}=(1- \frac{1}{n})D(p)$ . Then $\tilde{p}=c$ , the Coumot price meets the same condition
$d(p-\tilde{p})=(\overline{D}-dp^{l}/)n$ The lower bound for deviation of the Coumot price from the
Walrasian price under given conditions is $0$ . Figure 2 provide$s$ the corresponding example.
Figure 2.
$V$
Now consider the following regulation problem. Assume that under transition to the
deregulated market a state regulated monopoly that provided electricity for some region is
splitted in $n$ companies with the same constant marginal co$stc^{a}=c$ . How large should be $n$ in
order to prevent the increase of the market price more than 500/0 of the cost? It depends on the
demand elasticity. Consider a moderate estimate of this value for the electricity market:
$e(p)=0.2$ . Proceeding from proposition 2, we obtain $n=15$ . Even if we take the more
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favorable value $e(c)=0.2$ then we obtain $n= \frac{c}{(p-c)e(c)}-1=9$ . Thus a standard assumption
that the 20% barrier for the large$st$ company provides a sufficiently competitive market (see, for
instance, Dyakova, 2003) seems to fail in this case.
Now consider another popular measure of the market competitiveness –the Herfindahl-
Hircshman index (Hirschman, $1963$) $HHI= \sum_{a}(y_{a}\cdot 100)^{2}$ where $y_{a}=^{V}/a_{V}$ is the market share
of company $a$ .
Proposition 3. Under any fixed $HHI=^{10}/4n$ and market elasticity $e(p)=e$ for the
Cournot outcome, such that $e\sqrt{n}>$ ], the ratio ofthe Walrasian and the Cournot prices meets
the inequality:
$p/*\tilde{p}^{-1\leq(e\sqrt{n}-1)^{-1}}$ (4)
This estimate becomes a strict equality in the case where a largefirm with the market share
$/\iota_{\sqrt{n}}$ , a fxed marginal cost $c$ and unbounded capacity interacts with the competitive fiinge
with lower costs andmaximal capacity $V_{F}=(1- \frac{1}{\sqrt{n}})D(p)$ .
Under the symmetric oligopoly with the same $HHI$, the price deviation meets (3) as an
equality.
Proof. Under the given HHI, the share of one firm in the total production does not exceed
$n^{-1/2}$ . So the inequality (4) follows from Proposition 2. The latter two statements of the
proposition relate to the examples considered in the note and proposition 2 respectively.
Consider again the regulation problem. Now, the question is: how low should be the $HHI$ in
order to prevent the increase of the market price more than 50% of the cost? The US govemment
agencies propose (see Report of Office of Economic, 2000) that $HHI\leq 1000(n\geq 10)$ means
that no firn obtains the market power, and the market is sufficiently competitive. Consider
198
favorable demand electricity $e(c)=0.2$ . Under the symmetric oligopoly, we obtain the desirable
result. However, in the case of a large firm with the competitive fringe,
$p/_{c}-1= \frac{1}{(\sqrt{n}+1)e(c)}>1$ , that is, the market price exceed the marginal cost more than two
times.
Note2. The value $e(c)=0.2$ means that $e(p)\geq 0.5$ in the latter example. For the demand
with the constant elasticity $e(p)=0.2$ , the result would be essentially worser.
4. Empirical study.
In this section we compute NE of the unique-price auction for several variants of the
electricity market in the Central economic region of Russia. The paper by Dyakova (2003) based
on the data from the RAO UES provides the following values of marginal costs and production
capacities of the generating companies in this region. (See Table 1.)
Table 1.
Generator Marginal cost Capacity







We consider several demand functions $D(p)=N-\wp$ corresponding to the consumption
and the price in 2000:
For the local market model, we find the Coumot outcome and Vickrey outcome for two
variants ofthe market structure:
a) 5 independent companies,
b) 3 independent companies (Mosenergo, Rosenergoatom and UGC including all the rest
generators).
For each slope ratio $\gamma$ , we evaluate th$e$ deviations of the Coumot price from the Walrasian
price.
Table 2. Walrasian $(\tilde{p})$ and Coumot $(p)$ prices for the electricity market in the Central
economic region ofRussia. The cases with 5 and 3 generating companies.
Our results show that deviation of the Coumot price from the Walrasian price strongly
depends on the slope ofthe demand curve and practically interesting values $\gamma=0.1-0.2,$ .
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5. Network markets and the problem of multiple Cournot equilibria.
Consider two local markets connected by a transmitting line. Every local market $l=1,2$ is
characterized by the finite set $A^{l}$ of producers, $|A^{l}|=n_{l}$ , the cost functions $C^{a}(v),a\in A^{l}$ , and
demand function $D^{l}(p)$ , in the same way as the local market in Section 3: each cost hnction is
a private information of agent $a$ , the demand function and other market parameters are a
common knowledge. Let $k\in(O,1)$ be the loss coefficient that shows the share of the lost good
(in particular, the electric power) under transmission from one market to the other, $Q$ is the
maximal amount of the transmitted good. Consider Coumot competition in this model. Then
each producer sets $v^{a}\in[0,V^{a}]$ . The interaction is as follows.
1. Each firm finds out its cost function.
2. Simultaneously and independently each firm reports the auctioneer its strategy.
3. For a given strategy combination nodal cut-off prices $C\sim l$ and transmitted volume $q$ are
determined as follows.
Let $\overline{c}^{l}(v),l=1,2$, denote the cut-off prices for isolated markets, such that $D^{l}(c \lrcorner)=\sum_{a\in\Lambda}v_{l^{q}}$ ,
$\lambda=(1-k)^{-1}$ . If $\lambda^{-\downarrow}\leq\overline{c}^{2}(\overline{v})/\overline{c}^{1}(\overline{v})\leq\lambda$ then $q=0$ , the final prices are $c^{l}\sim(\overline{v})=\overline{c}^{l}(\overline{v}),$ $l=1,2$ ,
that is, the markets stay isolated. If $\overline{c}^{2}(\overline{v})/\overline{c}^{1}(\overline{v})>\lambda$ then $q$ (the transmitted volume fiom
market 1 to market 2) is a solution of the system
$D^{2}(c^{2}\sim)=a^{\mathcal{V}^{a}+\overline{q};}\Lambda$
(5)
$D(c^{1})= \sum_{A^{1}}v^{a}-\overline{q}$ ; (6)
$c^{2}\sim=A_{C}^{\sim 1}$ , until $\overline{q}>Q$ .
The unique solution of the system exists because the involved functions are monotonous and
continuous. If $\overline{q}>Q$ then $q=Q,$ $C\sim i$ are determined Rom (5),(6) with $\overline{q}=Q,$ $\sim c^{2}>A_{C}^{\sim 1}$ . The
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capacity constraint is binding in this case. The case $\overline{c}^{1}(\overline{v})/\overline{c}^{2}(\overline{v})>\lambda$ is treated in the symmetric
way. This section aims to study these 3 types ofNash equilibria of the auction.
a). The first-order conditions for the type a) outcome with prices
$p_{1}^{r},$ $p_{2}^{l}$ $s.t$ . $\lambda^{-1}<p_{2}^{l}/p_{1}^{l}<\lambda$ , (7)
to be a Coumot equilibrium are quite similar to the conditions (1), (2) for the local market:
$v^{a}’\in(p_{i}-C^{a’}(v^{a*}))|D^{j_{1}}(p_{i}^{l})|$ , for any $a\in A^{j}$ s.t. $C^{a_{1}}(0)<p_{i}$
$v^{a*}=0$ if $C^{a\prime}(0)\geq p_{i}^{l}$ ,
where $C^{a}$ ‘ $(v)=[C_{-}^{a\prime}(v),C_{+}^{a\prime}(v)]$ in the break points ofthe marginal cost hnction.
Besides that,
$\sum_{A^{i}}v^{a*}=D(p_{j}^{l})$, $l=1,2$ .
b). For the type b) outcome with
$q\in(0,Q),$ $\Phi i=p_{2}^{s}$ ,
the first-order conditions of the Coumot equilibrium are obtained in a similar way. Note that, for
any small change of the strategy $v^{a*}$ , producer $a\in A^{1}$ stays in the market with the demand
function
$D^{1}(p_{1}( \overline{v}))+\lambda(D^{2}(\psi_{1}(\overline{v}))-\sum_{A^{2}}v^{a})$




$a\in A^{1}$ $st$ . $C^{a*}(0)<p_{1}^{l},$ $v^{a_{*}}=0$ if $C^{a\uparrow}(0)\geq pi$ .




$a\in A^{2}$ st. $C^{a_{\dagger}}(0)<p_{2}^{l},$ $v^{a*}=0$ if $C^{a\uparrow}(0)\geq p_{2}^{t}$ .
c). Finally, ifthe capacity constraint is binding
$q=Q$, $\phi_{1}^{l}<p_{2}^{l}$ ,
then the F.O.C.$s$ are
$v^{a}\in(p_{i}^{l}-C^{a^{1}}(v^{a^{*}}))|D^{j}$ ‘ $(p_{j})|$ , for any $a\in A^{j}$ s.t. $C^{a’}(0)<p_{j}^{l}$
$v^{a^{t}}=0$ if $C^{a’}(0)\geq p_{i}^{l}$ ,
$\sum_{\Lambda^{1}}v^{a^{l}}=D(p_{1}^{t})+Q$
$\sum_{A^{2}}v^{a}=D(p_{2}^{l})-\lambda Q$ .
Thus, even in the simplest variant of the network market there exist 5 possible local
equilibria. The following proposition shows that some of them are incompatible, and reduces the
set of variants for examination.
Proposition 4. Underfixedparameters ofthe two-node market, only one local equilibrium of
the types a) or c) may exist. More precisely, if the Cournot equilibrium prices $\overline{p}_{j},$ $i=1,2$ , for
separated markets meet condition (7) then only a local equilibrium of the type a) exists in the
market, otherwise if $\overline{p}_{i}>\Phi_{j}^{-}$ then only a local equilibrium ofthe type c) with theflowfrom the
market $j$ to the market imay exist (but does not necesserely exist), $i=1,2,$ $j=\{1,2\}\backslash i$ .
Proof. Consider a system that determines the price$s$ for a local equilibrium of the type c)
with the flow ffom 1 to 2:
$\sum_{A^{1}}S_{c}^{a1}(\overline{\overline{p}}_{1})=D^{1}(\overline{\overline{p}}_{1})+Q,\sum_{A^{2}}S_{c}^{a2}(p_{2}=)=D^{2}(\overline{\overline{p}}_{2})-Q,$
$p_{2}>\phi_{1}==$ . (8)
Let $p_{i}(Q)=,$ $i=1,2$ , denote a solution of the equations for any $Q\geq 0$ . Note that $\overline{p}_{i}=\overline{\overline{p}}_{i}(0)$ ,
$i=1,2,$ $p_{1}=(Q)\uparrow Q,$ $p_{2}(Q)=\downarrow Q$ . If the equilibrium a) exists then $p_{2}=(Q)<\overline{p}_{2}<\Phi_{1}^{-}<\overline{\Phi}_{1}(Q)$ for
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any $Q>0$ , so the system (8) is incompatible and, similarly, a symmetric equilibrium with the
flow Rom 2 to 1 does not exist. Otherwise if $\overline{p}_{2}>\Phi_{1}^{-}$ then a solution of (8) exists if $Q$ is
sufficiently small, that is $p_{2}=(Q)>\phi_{1}^{=}(Q)$ . A solution to the symmetric system does not exist in
this case. $0$
This result simplifies analysis of the market. However, our paper (2005) shows that a typical
case is where three different local equilibria of the types a) and b) exist, some of them are true
NE, the other are not stable with respect to the large change of the production volume by some
agent. As the number of local markets in the network increases, the number of possible local
equilibria of the network market grows with the exponentical rate. The problem of their careful
computation and analysis for the actual markets $s$eems to be hopeless.
This section aims to develop an altemative approach to analysis of such markets. Since the
loss coefficients in the actual networks are usually less then 0.1, we show that NE of a market
with the losses may be approximated by the NE of the similar market without losses and evaluate
the error. Then we consider a problem of the Coumot equilibrium search and analysis for a
network market without losses.
Below we study these issues for the market with affine demand functions and constant
marginal costs. We also assume that capacity constraints in production are not binding. Formally
we assume that $D^{t}(p)=\overline{D}_{l}-dp,$ $C^{a}(v)=c_{j}v$ for $a\in A^{j},i=1,2$ . First let us show that the
deviation of the type b) equilibrium for the market with losses from a similar equilibrium for the
market without losses smoothly depends on the loss coefficient and is small for a typical value
$k\leq 0.1$ . Under a flow from market 1 to market 2, the equilibrium price $pi$ at the market 1 meets
equation
$\sum_{A_{1}}(pi-c_{1})(d_{1}+\lambda^{2}d_{2})+\sum_{A_{2}}(\phi_{1}^{l}-c_{2})(d_{1}+\lambda d_{2})=D^{1}(p_{1})+\lambda D^{2}(\Phi i)$ .
The market without losses corresponds to $\lambda=1$ . According to the theorem on the derivative
ofan implicit function,
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Thus $| \frac{dp_{1}}{d\lambda}|/p_{1}|_{\lambda=1}\leq\frac{2d_{2}|A_{1}|+(d_{1}+d_{2})|A_{2}|}{(d_{1}+d_{2})\Downarrow A_{1}|+|A_{2}|-1)}\approx 1$ for $d_{1}=d_{2}$ ; $\frac{p_{1}(1)-p_{1}(\lambda)}{p_{1}(1)}\approx\lambda-1\leq 0.1^{\cdot}$ under
typical values ofthe loss coefficient.
A similar evaluation holds for an equilibrium of the type c) with the binding transmission
capacity constraint. However, an equilibrium of the type a) (with separated markets) does not
exist under $k=0$ , while for $k>0$ a local equilibrium of this type may exist and essentially
differ ffom any equilibrium of the network market without losses. For instance, consider a
symmetric oligopoly with equal parameters for the both local markets. Then the Coumot price
for each separated local market is $\overline{p}=c+\frac{(\overline{D}-dc)}{d(m+1)}$ , where $m=|A_{1}|=|A_{2}|$ . The Coumot price for
the united market with $k=0$ is $p=c+ \frac{(\overline{D}-dc)}{d(2m+1)}$ , that is, $\overline{p}-c\approx 2(p-c)$ .
However, the local equilibrium with separated markets is not a true Nash equilibrium under
typical value$s$ of the electricity market parameters! Let us prove this proposition.
The conditions for the local equilibrium of the type a) take the form: $v^{a^{*}}=v_{j}^{l}=(p_{i}^{l}-c_{l})d$ ,
$a\in A^{j},$ $p_{j}^{*}-c_{j}= \frac{\simeq D_{i}}{d(n_{j}+1)}$ where $\approx D_{i}=\overline{D}_{i}-c_{l}d$ . Hence $f^{a}(\overline{v}^{l})=(p_{i}^{l}-c_{l})^{2}d,$ $a\in A^{j}$ . The
optimal price $\overline{p}_{1}$ for $a\in A^{1}$ in the joint market meets equation
$\overline{p}_{1}-c_{1}=\frac{\overline{D}_{1}+\lambda\overline{D}_{2}-c_{1}(1+\lambda^{2^{*}})d-(n_{1}-1)v_{1}-An_{2}v_{2}^{*}}{2d(1+\lambda^{2})}$.
Condition (7) for existence of the local equilibrium and the conditions of its instability under
the optimal deviation ofagent $a\in A^{1}$ take the form:
$\lambda>p_{2}/p[>\lambda^{-1}\Leftrightarrow\lambda\geq(\frac{=D_{2}}{d(n_{2}+1)}+c_{2})/(\frac{=D_{1}}{d(n_{1}+1)}+c_{1})>\lambda^{-1}$ ; (9)
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$f_{1}( \overline{v})<f_{1}(\overline{v}^{r}\Vert\overline{v}_{1})\Leftrightarrow\frac{2D_{1}^{\sqrt{1+\lambda^{2}}}--}{d(n_{1}+1)}<(’\lambda_{\mathcal{L}_{2}}-\lambda^{2}c_{1}+\frac{2Dl=}{d(n_{1}+1)}+\frac{\lambda D_{2}=}{d(n_{2}+1)})$ (10)
Let us show that condition (10) holds under typical parameters of an electricity market, so
the local equilibrium of the type a) (with separated local markets) is not a true NE. Proceeding
from (9),(10) it suffices to check the following inequality:
$\frac{2\overline{\overline{D_{1}}}(\sqrt{1+\lambda^{2}}-1)}{d(n_{1}+1)}<\frac{\overline{\overline{D}_{1}}}{d(n_{1}+1)}+c_{1}(1-\lambda^{2})$ or
$1< \frac{1}{e(c_{1})(n_{1}+1)}(\frac{3-2^{\sqrt{1+\lambda^{2}}}}{\lambda^{2}-1})$ . (11)
Consider several typical values of the loss coefficient.
Proposition 5. For the loss $coeff\iota cientk=0.1$ , the separated equilibrium does not exist if
$(n+1)e(c)<0.08$ or ne$(p)<1.08$ , where $p= \frac{c+(\overline{D}-dc)}{cd(n+1)}$ is the local equilibrium price. For
$k=0.05$ this proposition holds if $(n+1)e(c)<0.9$ or ne$(p)<1.9$ . In particular, $\iota fe(p)\leq 0.1$
then the equilibrium does not existfor $n<19$ .
Proof immediately follows from inequality (11) and relations
$p=c(1+ \frac{1}{(n+1)e(c)})=\frac{c}{(1-1/ne(p))}o$
Proceeding ffom the given results we expect that in a general case the analysis of Coumot
equilibria for a network market may be reduced to the analysis of a similar market without
losses. For a two-node market without losses, we may consider only local equilibria of the types
b) and c), and there exist at most one equilibrium of each type. It would be nice to show that only
one Coumot equilibrium exists in this market in a general case. The following example shows
that, unfortunately, this is not true.
Consider conditions for local equilibria b) with the united market and c) with the binding
constraint and a flow from market 2 to market 1. Let $\overline{p}$ and $(\overline{p}_{1},\overline{p}_{2})denote$ the corresponding
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prices, $S_{C}^{i,12}$ , and $S_{C}^{i}$ be the Coumot supply functions at the market $i$ under the united market
and under the binding constraint respectively. Then
$S_{C}^{1,12}(\overline{p})+S_{C}^{2,12}(\overline{p})=D^{1}(\overline{p})+D^{2}(\overline{p}),$ $|S_{C}^{2,12}(\overline{p})-D^{2}(\overline{p})|\leq Q$ ,
$S_{C}^{2}(\overline{p}_{2})-D^{2}(\overline{p}_{2})=Q=D^{1}(\overline{p}_{1})-S_{C}^{1}(\overline{p}_{1}),\overline{p}_{1}>\overline{p}_{2}$ .
First, let us show that these conditions are incompatible if $S_{\dot{C}}^{112}(\overline{p})=S_{C}^{1}(\overline{p})$, that is, the
production capacity of the importing market is fully employed at the price $\overline{p}$ . Since
$S_{C}^{2,12}(\overline{p})\geq S_{C}^{2}(\overline{p})$ and $S_{C}^{2,12}(\overline{p})-D^{2}(\overline{p})\leq Q$ then $\overline{p}\leq\overline{p}_{2}$ . Moreover, $D^{1}(\overline{p})-S_{\dot{C}}^{112}(\overline{p})\leq Q$ , so
$\overline{p}\geq\overline{p}_{1}$ under the given condition. This contradicts to $\overline{p}_{1}>\overline{p}_{2}$ .
However, the both local equilibria may exist in the case where $S_{C}^{2,12}(\overline{p})=S_{c}^{2}(\overline{p}_{2})=S_{m\cdot x}^{2}$ .
Consider a symmetric oligopoly with $m$ producers and fixed marginal costs $c^{a}\equiv c$ at the market
1, and $D^{1}(p)=\overline{D}^{1}-pd$ . Then the equilibrium price and the profit of each firm at the
equilibrium c) are
$\overline{p}_{1}=\frac{\overline{D}_{1}-Q+mdc}{d(m+1)},$ $Pr_{1}=d(\overline{p}_{1}-c)^{2}$ , (12)
and similar values for the equilibrium b) are
$\overline{p}=\frac{\overline{D}_{1}+2mdc+d\check{p}_{2}}{2d(m+1)},$ $Pr=2d[(\overline{DI}\tilde{p}22d2^{-C}$ (13)
where $\tilde{p}_{2}$ is the competitive equilibrium and the Coumot price for the separated market 2:
$\overline{D}_{2}-\Gamma p_{2}=S_{\max}^{2}$ . So at each equilibrium the exporting market 2 supplies the same volume $S_{m\cdot x}^{2}$ .
At the equilibrium c), each firm at the market 1 produces less than at the equilibrium b). So the
price is higher and the transmission capacity constraint is binding in the former local
equilibrium. By a sufficiently large increase of the production volume, a firm in the market 1
may reduce the price and make the constraint unbinding (see Fig. 3).
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Figure 3.
Fig. 3. The inverse demandfunction underfixed strategies $v^{b}=\overline{v}^{a}$ for $b\in A^{1}\backslash \{a\},$ $v^{A_{2}}=S_{m\alpha}^{2}$ .
The demand function in this case is
$D(p)= \overline{D_{1}}+\overline{D}_{2}-S_{m*x}^{2}-2dp-\frac{m-1}{m+1}(\overline{D_{1}}-Q-cd)$ ,
the maximal profit for $a$ is
$Pr=(\overline{D_{1}}+\overline{D}_{2}-\frac{m-1}{m+1}(\overline{D_{1}}-Q-cd)-2cd)^{2}\oint d$ , where $\overline{D}_{2e}=\overline{D}_{2}-S_{m*}^{2},$ .
As to the local $\dot{e}$quilibrium b), it may be unstable with respect to sufficiently large decrease
of the production volume by some agent $a\in A^{1}$ , such that the transmission constraint becomes
binding. The demand function and the maximal profit in this case are
$\hat{D}(p)=\overline{D_{1}}-Q-\frac{m-1}{m+1}(+\tilde{p}_{2}d-2cd)$ $/2d-pd$ ,
$\hat{P}r=[\overline{D_{1}}-Q-\frac{m-1}{m+1}(+\tilde{p}_{2}d-2cd)$$/2d-cd]^{2}/Ld$ .
The following proposition summarizes the results of our study.
Proposition 6. For the given two-node market, two Cournot equilibria exist ifand only ifthe
profit values determined by (10)$-(13)$ meet inequalities $Pr\geq Pr,$ $Pr_{1}\geq\hat{P}r$ .




Consider the following example. Let $\overline{D}_{2e}=1,\overline{D_{1}}=2.5,$ $d=1,$ $c_{1}=1$ . Then we obtain the
following system for $Q$ and $m$ :
$\sqrt{2}(\frac{m+1}{2}I^{Q\geq 1.5(\sqrt{2}}-1)\geq Q(\frac{m-1}{2}+\sqrt{2})$ .
In particular, for any odd $m_{1}=2k+1$ , we obtain an interval
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